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4.1 Introduction
The U.S. current account deﬁcit was a record $668 billion in 2004, ac-
counting for 5.7 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) and fully two-
thirds of global net foreign lending. Its size, as well as the unprecedented
foreign ﬂows into U.S. bonds associated with it, have raised concerns about
how the adjustment to a more balanced current account will play out. One
grim scenario begins with foreigners suddenly losing their appetite for U.S.
assets, and, in the process of unwinding their large U.S. positions, pushing
up interest rates, depressing growth and causing a large depreciation of the
dollar. Worries about such a disorderly adjustment ﬁrst surfaced in 2000,
when the U.S. deﬁcit-GDP ratio crossed the 4 percent mark.
The conventional wisdom on current account adjustment is that some
current account deﬁcits are more problematic than others. Important fac-
tors are the size and persistence of the deﬁcit, its use and ﬁnancing, and the
openness and indebtedness of the economy. For example, Summers (2004)
notes that 5 percent of GDP is a traditional danger point for current ac-
count deﬁcits and argues that deﬁcits rising to ﬁnance consumption and
government spending and deﬁcits supported by short-term ﬁnancing are
4
Current Account Deﬁcits 
in Industrial Countries
The Bigger They Are, 
the Harder They Fall?
Caroline Freund and Frank Warnock
Caroline Freund is a senior economist in the Development Economics Research Group of
the World Bank. Frank Warnock is an associate professor at the University of Virginia’s Dar-
den Business School.
For helpful comments, we are grateful to participants at the NBER pre-Conference and
Conference meetings on G7 Current Account Imbalances, especially Assaf Razin and work-
shops at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Federal Reserve Board. We also
thank Jillian Faucette and Alex Rothenberg for excellent research assistance and Philip Lane
and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti for providing an early update of their data on international
investment positions. The views in this paper are solely the responsibility of the authors and
should not be interpreted as reﬂecting the views of the World Bank.of relatively greater concern. Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2004) highlight the im-
portance of goods-market integration in adjustment because the magni-
tude of exchange rate adjustment needed to reduce a deﬁcit is greater when
markets are not well integrated and the substitution between foreign and
domestic goods is low. Roubini and Setser (2005) worry about the size of
the foreign debt position and the corresponding interest payments. Con-
cerns about delaying a U.S. adjustment abound, for example, Bergsten and
Williamson (2004, 24) write “[n]o one doubts that adjustment will eventu-
ally happen. The sooner it starts, the less chance it will take a catastrophic
form.”
We aim to evaluate the importance of these concerns by examining the
U.S. situation within the context of current account reversals that have oc-
curred in a wide range of industrial countries. In all, we have at our dis-
posal twenty-six current account reversals that occurred between 1980 and
2003. The twenty-six episodes vary in a number of ways and allow us to
place the current U.S. situation in context; while the United States may be
in what it considers uncharted waters (with respect to its own history),
along many dimensions its current scenario is not atypical.
There are well-known characteristics of current account reversals in in-
dustrial countries. In particular, they tend to occur around 5 percent of
GDP and involve currency depreciation and a decrease in GDP growth
(Freund 2000, 2005).1 But typical can conceal considerable deviations
across episodes as some reversals are more benign than others. The main
goal of this paper is to examine the extent to which aspects of the buildup
of the current account deﬁcit are associated with more severe outcomes; we
attempt to uncover the set of preconditions that is associated with more be-
nign outcomes and the set that is associated with greater pain. Speciﬁcally,
we examine—in the context of twenty-six current account reversals—the
extent to which variation in the size and persistence of the current account
deﬁcit, its nature (whether it is funding consumption or something more
productive, such as investment), the size and composition of ﬁnancing, and
the openness of the economy matter for the adjustment process. We then
characterize the adjustment process using three main measures: the extent
of exchange rate depreciation, the slowdown in GDP growth, and the im-
provement in the current account balance that accompany reversals.
We begin by updating the characterization of current account reversals.
To do this, we append the Freund (2000) analysis with a study of the dy-
namics of various ﬁnancial variables through the adjustment process and
incorporate data through 2003. The characterization can be summarized as
follows. We verify that the main results from Freund (2000) still hold: coun-
tries tend to experience slow GDP growth and a real depreciation as the cur-
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1. Several analyses have replicated and updated these results, including IMF (2002), De-
belle and Galati (2005), and Croke, Karnin, and Leduc (2005).rent account adjusts, and the adjustment appears to be spurred by real ex-
port growth as well as declining investment and consumption. Current ac-
count adjustments are generally matched by reversals in the ﬁnancial ac-
count. In emerging markets, all types of portfolio investment ﬂows—debt,
equity, and banking—adjust sharply (Rothenberg and Warnock 2005), but
in our sample of industrial countries, the ﬁnancial account dynamics are
more subtle. The most dramatic adjustment is in the banking or other ﬂows,
which decrease over 2 percentage points (of GDP) in the ﬁrst two years of
the adjustment. In addition, bond inﬂows appear to surge in the run-up to
the reversal. In contrast, equity and direct investment ﬂows do not show
well-deﬁned dynamics around the adjustment process.
Our results on the relationship between preconditions and outcomes can
be summed up as follows. We ﬁnd that larger deﬁcits take longer to resolve
and are associated with relatively slower income growth during recovery.
There is no signiﬁcant correlation between the size of the deﬁcit and the ex-
tent of depreciation. In contrast, reversals that were preceded by a persis-
tent deﬁcit (a deﬁcit that lasted for at least ﬁve years before reversing) are
not associated with more depreciation or slower growth. We ﬁnd that con-
sumption and government-driven deﬁcits tend to lead to a greater real de-
preciation than investment driven episodes: a 1 percentage point shift from
investment to consumption (or government spending) generates an addi-
tional 0.7 percentage points in average annual depreciation during adjust-
ment. We ﬁnd relatively little evidence that the level of openness or the na-
ture of the ﬁnancing—whether it is through bond ﬂows or more directly
into productive uses, such as equity or direct investment—impact the
severity of the adjustment. Deﬁcits associated with greater bond inﬂows do
appear to be followed by larger increases in interest rates—perhaps be-
cause the bond inﬂows kept interest rates abnormally low, as in Warnock
and Warnock (2005)—and a sharper decrease in equity prices. Finally, the
size of the external position does not appear to aﬀect the outcome.
We also examine the 1987 U.S. adjustment episode to discern to what ex-
tent it reﬂected the typical case and look at the key indicators for 2004 in
order to gauge where the United States stands with respect to adjustment.
We ﬁnd that in the 1987 episode, the extent of depreciation was very close
to predicted, though adjustment was somewhat slower with less of a de-
crease in growth. We use 2004 values of key variables to predict the pattern
of U.S. adjustment were it to begin now. The analysis suggests that were the
adjustment to start in 2005, the dollar would depreciate 25 percent from its
peak but only 2
1⁄4percent annually over the next three years, as much of the
depreciation occurs before the current account actually reverses.
Our work is complementary to many contemporaneous papers. The
most similar in spirit is Croke, Kamin, and Leduc (2005), who employ a
similar data set to analyze how experiences diﬀered between episodes char-
acterized by a growth slowdown and those that were not, but they do not
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green (chap. 6 in this volume) also use an event study approach with a much
longer historical sample (going back to 1880) for a much broader range of
countries; in their study, data limitations preclude analysis of the range of
preconditions and outcomes that we are able to analyze. Clarida, Gorretti,
and Taylor (chap. 5 in this volume), using empirical time series analysis, ex-
amine the points at which current accounts might reverse. Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (chap. 9 in this volume), in a general equilibrium model, start from
the assumption that the current account adjusts and then trace out the im-
plications. Faruqee et al. (chap. 10 in this volume) examine current account
dynamics in the context of the IMF’s global general equilibrium model.
Our work is also related to the literature on current account reversals in
emerging markets (sometimes referred to as the sudden-stop literature).
But reversals in our industrial country study are distinctly diﬀerent from
those in emerging markets. For example, whereas we ﬁnd that reversals are
associated with adjustments in either growth or the exchange rate, emerg-
ing market reversals are not associated with large changes in growth
(Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 1998; Chinn and Prasad 2003), perhaps because
the exchange rate adjusts much more.2 On the ﬁnancial side, our industrial
country results diﬀer from those for emerging markets for two reasons.
One, ﬁnancial systems in industrial countries are likely more eﬃcient in-
termediating funds, making the type of capital ﬂows associated with the
run-up to a reversal less important. Two, the foreign debt of industrial
countries is more likely to be denominated in the home currency, amelio-
rating the balance sheet eﬀect of a devaluation.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 deﬁnes episodes of adjust-
ment, examines empirical regularities of current account and ﬁnancial ac-
count adjustment in industrial countries, and discusses persistent deﬁcits.
Section 4.3 examines whether case studies support the notion that bigger
deﬁcits (in terms of size, consumption, and debt ﬂows) imply harder falls.
Section 4.4 presents robustness analyses of the key results. Section 4.5 dis-
cusses the United States in light of the predictions. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Characterizations of Episodes of Adjustment and Persistent Deﬁcits
In this section, we deﬁne and characterize current account reversals and
persistent deﬁcits.
4.2.1 Episodes of Adjustment
We update previous results from Freund (2000) using data through 2003
and also incorporate ﬁnancial variables. We document current account ad-
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2. In contrast, Edwards (2001), which analyzes current account deﬁcits in a sample of 120
countries, ﬁnds evidence that current account reversals lead to lower per-capita GDP growth.justment from a large deﬁcit to highlight patterns of adjustment. The fol-
lowing are criteria for a current account adjustment:
1. The current account deﬁcit-GDP ratio exceeded 2 percent before the
reversal.
2. The average deﬁcit-GDP ratio was reduced by at least 2 percentage
points over three years (from the minimum to the centered three-year av-
erage).
3. The maximum deﬁcit-GDP ratio in the ﬁve years after the reversal
was not larger than the minimum in the three years before the reversal.
4. The current account deﬁcit-GDP ratio was reduced by at least one-
third.
Using these criteria on data from high-income Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries from 1980 to
2003, we identify 26 episodes of adjustment, listed in table 4.1. In our
sample, there is considerable variation across episodes, as current account
troughs occurred between 1980 (Austria and Sweden) and 1999 (Austria,
again, and New Zealand); ranged from relatively small deﬁcits (2.1 percent
in France) to some that were quite large (Portugal’s 16.1 percent deﬁcit);
and were associated with a wide variety in the size of net foreign asset po-
sitions (from those that were nearly balanced or even positive, to one that
exceeded negative 70 percent of GDP).3
Figure 4.1 documents the pattern of adjustment across a range of vari-
ables, with event time 0 corresponding to the year the current account bal-
ance is most negative. Consistent with previous studies, countries tend
toexperience slow GDP growth (and increasing unemployment) and a real
depreciation as the current account adjusts. In addition, real export
growth, as well as declining investment and consumption, spurs adjust-
ment. Adjustments are associated with worsening budget deﬁcits and a
pause in the accumulation of reserves, but little change in real long- or
short-term interest rates.
We next examine ﬁnancial account dynamics through the adjustment
period. Absent large shifts in errors and omissions or sharp movements
in the capital account (which, for most countries, is too small to adjust
much), current account adjustments must be matched by reversals in the
ﬁnancial account, but for industrial countries we know little about which
components of the ﬁnancial account actually adjust. As Rothenberg and
Warnock (2005) show that net amounts can mask considerable diﬀer-
ences in inﬂows and outﬂows, ﬁgure 4.2 is designed to show, for each of
the four main components of the ﬁnancial account (direct investment,
Current Account Deﬁcits in Industrial Countries 137
3. Net foreign asset positions and gross liabilities positions are from Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2005). Throughout our paper, using published IIP data instead of the Lane Milesi-
Ferretti data set would produce similar results, but with fewer observations.equity ﬂows, bond ﬂows, and banking or other ﬂows), the adjustment
process for net inﬂows (inﬂows minus outﬂows), gross outﬂows, and
gross inﬂows.
In emerging markets, all types of portfolio investment inﬂows dry up
around the time of the current account reversal (Rothenberg and Warnock
2005). In sharp contrast, in our industrial country sample, the bulk of the
adjustment in the year immediately following the current account trough
comes via a sharp decrease in banking (or other) ﬂows. In contrast, net
direct investment, equity, and bond ﬂows do not show clearly deﬁned dy-
namics around the adjustment. The gross ﬂows (depicted in the second and
third columns of ﬁgure 4.2) do not provide much additional insight: the
only new information that we can glean from the gross ﬂows is that bond
inﬂows typically surge in the run-up to the reversal and peak one to two
years into the adjustment process.
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Table 4.1 Episodes of adjustment
Country Trough year Current account/GDP NFA/GDP
Australia 1989 –5.9 –43.9
Austria 1980 –4.9 –12.8
1999 –3.2 –19.5
Belgium 1981 –4.1 –1.9
Canada 1981 –4.2 –36.5
1993 –3.9 –36.4
Denmark 1986 –5.3 –46.7
Finland 1991 –5.5 –34.3
France 1982 –2.1 –0.5
Greece 1985 –8.0
1990 –4.2
Iceland 1982 –8.2 –46.3
1991 –4.0 –49.6
Ireland 1981 –13.1 –60.0
Italy 1981 –2.6 –3.6
1992 –2.4 –11.0
New Zealand 1984 –13.3 –53.4
1999 –6.2 –71.7
Norway 1986 –6.0 –13.6
Portugal 1981 –2.8 –12.0
Spain 1981 –2.8 –12.0
1991 –3.6 –16.1
Sweden 1980 –3.3 –7.4
1992 –3.4 –21.1
United Kingdom 1989 –5.1 9.1
United States 1987 –3.4 –1.6
Average –5.6 –26.4
Note: Current account and NFA (net foreign asset) are at the time of the current account
trough.Current Account Deﬁcits in Industrial Countries 139
Fig. 4.1 Current account adjustment: The real side
4.2.2 Persistent Deﬁcits
In addition to reversals, we characterize persistent deﬁcits because much
of the concern over the current U.S. episode has focused on its extended du-
ration. Persistence is also related to the net foreign asset position (NFA;
which we also consider in the following), as persistent deﬁcits will tend to140 Caroline Freund and Frank Warnock
Fig. 4.1 (cont.)
decrease the NFA position.4 Still, we think it is useful to have a separate
variable that focuses entirely on duration in order to characterize these
episodes and also to examine whether reversals from persistent deﬁcits are
inherently diﬀerent. In addition, NFA position data are only available for
twenty-four of the twenty-six episodes.
We deﬁne deﬁcits as persistent if they satisfy the following three criteria:
1. The current account (CA)-GDP ratio was below 2 percent for ﬁve
consecutive years.
2. There was no reversal (as deﬁned in the preceding for ﬁve years).
3. The CA-GDP ratio was below two-thirds of its initial level in each of
the ﬁve years.
The ﬁrst criterion ensures that we are examining persistent deﬁcits. The
second ensures that the deﬁcit is not undergoing a reversal; this criterion
4. Persistent deﬁcits need not result in large negative NFA positions if valuation eﬀects
oﬀset the current account deﬁcits. In practice, this can be true for a given year as exchange
rate movements can lead to large valuation adjustments. However, if there is mean reversion
in exchange rates, the valuation changes may well net to zero in the medium to long run.eﬀectively eliminates V-shaped deﬁcits. The third eliminates slow improve-
ments and highly variable deﬁcits. In all, the criteria leave us with two types
of persistent deﬁcits, those that are continuously worsening and those that
are ﬂat but deep.
We identify fourteen episodes of persistent deﬁcits (table 4.2). Of these,
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Fig. 4.2 Current account adjustment: The ﬁnancial sideten were eventually reversed via adjustment episodes.5 Four—Australia,
Greece, Portugal, and the United States—have ongoing persistent deﬁcits
that remain unresolved. The average duration of a persistent episode is
nearly eight years. Characteristics of persistent deﬁcits are shown in table
4.3. The ﬁrst column shows values for persistent-episode countries during
the episode, the second column is for the same group outside of the
episode, and the ﬁnal column is for all other industrial countries. By deﬁ-
nition, the current account position is, on average, worse. Key characteris-
tics include lower-than-average savings rates, high net foreign debt, and
somewhat elevated short-term interest rates. They are also somewhat less
open—though this measure is highly variable and does not account for
country size.6 In contrast, investment-to-GDP and income growth are
nearly identical to overall averages in the OECD. This suggests that per-
sistent deﬁcits are structural and that foreign investment is largely driven
by opportunities that would remain unexploited in a world where capital
was immobile.
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Table 4.2 Episodes of persistent deﬁcits
Country Year began Length of episode Average deﬁcit Average NFA
Australia 1980 10 –4.4 –32.0
1991a 13 –4.2 –54.0
Austria 1976 5 –3.8 –12.8
1995 6 –2.5 –18.1
Canada 1974 8 –3.7 –34.6
1986 8 –3.6 –34.2
Denmark 1981 10 –3.7 –39.8
Greece 1976b 10 –4.5
1995a 8 –5.7
Ireland 1976 6 –8.5 –52.7
New Zealand 1978 7 –5.6 –39.4
1994 7 –5.3 –68.2
Portugal 1996a 7 –7.5 –34.4
United States 1998a 6 –3.9 –19.3
Average 7.92c –4.8 –36.6
aEpisode may not have ended as of 2003.
bCurrent account data begins in 1976, so episode may have actually been longer.
cIncludes all episodes. If ongoing episodes are excluded, average is 7.7, indicating that recent
episodes are somewhat longer.
5. That is, ten of our twenty-six reversal episodes were preceded by persistent deﬁcits.
6. Countries that have run persistent deﬁcits are, on average, very similar in size to coun-
tries that have not (real GDP in US$ is about 4 percent greater); however, the standard devi-
ation of income is larger (about 70 percent greater).4.3 Are Some Reversals More Equal Than Others?
In this section, we evaluate whether large deﬁcits, deﬁcits that persist for
at least ﬁve years, or deﬁcits in countries with large foreign debt tend to in-
volve more severe reversals.7 To do so, we examine correlations between
various outcomes (income growth, the extent of depreciation, the com-
pleteness with which adjustment occurred, and movements in interest rates
and equity prices) with various preconditions (the size of the current ac-
count trough; whether the reversal was preceded by a persistent deﬁcit; the
extent to which it was associated with surges in consumption, investment,
or ﬁscal deﬁcits; the extent of openness and indebtedness to the rest of the
world; and the nature of its ﬁnancing). We use three measures of deprecia-
tion: the total real exchange rate adjustment during the seven years of the
episode, the existence of an exchange rate crisis in that period, and the av-
erage exchange rate adjustment from year 0 to year 3. Exchange rate crises
are identiﬁed using the Frankel and Rose (1996) deﬁnition, using monthly
data on the local currency-special drawing rights (SDR) nominal exchange
rate.8 We use two measures of growth: average growth in the three years of
recovery less average growth over the whole period and average growth in
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Table 4.3 Characteristics of persistent deﬁcit episodes (unweighted averages)
Persistent Persistent  Other 
deﬁcit countries,  deﬁcit countries,  industrial 
Variable in episode out of episode countries
CA/GDP –4.7 –1.5 1.0
GDP growth 2.9 3.2 2.8
Savings/GDP 20.8 22.4 25.2
Investment/GDP 23.7 23.1 23.7
Real short rate 3.4 2.2 2.1
Real long rate 3.5 3.1 3.5
Net foreign asset –0.4 –0.2 0.0
Fiscal balance/GDP –3.6 –3.8 –3.0
Openness 55.9 60.7 73.2
Notes:Averages for all persistent episodes, including unresolved episodes. All others includes
other countries and same currents during periods that do not qualify as persistent.
7. The IMF (2002) examines large deﬁcits, deﬁned as 4 percent of GDP or more that per-
sist for at least three years, in addition to the deﬁnition of reversals from Freund (2000). They
also ﬁnd that current account improvement increases as the size of the deﬁcit increases, but
less than one for one. Their focus is, however, on general characteristics of reversals, as op-
posed to diﬀerences between episodes with large and small deﬁcits. The deﬁnition is diﬀerent
from that of general reversals so does not provide a direct comparison between episodes with
large deﬁcits and more moderate deﬁcits.
8. A currency crisis has taken place if the nominal exchange rate depreciated by at least 25
percent over the last year and by at least 10 percent more than in the previous year.the three years of recovery less average growth in the three years before re-
covery. Asset price movements are captured by the change in short-term
rates, long-term rates, and equity prices (all adjusted for inﬂation) from
three years leading into the current account trough to the three years fol-
lowing. Finally, we characterize deﬁcits by the extent to which they were re-
solved after three years. Speciﬁcally, the variable RESOLVE is deﬁned as
the percentage point improvement in the current account GDP ratio from
year 0 to year 3. The deﬁnition of current account reversals implies that
RESOLVE will be correlated with the size of the deﬁcit: to qualify as a re-
versal, a signiﬁcant improvement in the current account must occur. Still,
this variable allows us to test whether other factors are correlated with ad-
justment and also the extent to which the average deﬁcit is improved. That
is, a coeﬃcient on CA/GDP at trough of –1 would imply that deﬁcits are
fully reversed after three years. A coeﬃcient of –.5 would imply they are 50
percent reversed. Simple correlations and signiﬁcance levels are presented
in table 4.4. A data appendix oﬀers more details about the variables.
4.3.1 Large and Persistent Deﬁcits
As noted in the introduction, current thinking suggests that large and
persistent deﬁcits will involve more pain. However, the correlations pre-
sented in table 4.4 imply that the resolution of large or persistent deﬁcits
does not require a more extensive depreciation nor are they more likely to
be associated with an exchange rate crisis. If anything, the correlations in-
dicate that large and persistent deﬁcits tend to involve less depreciation
than average. (We discuss this result in more detail in the next section.) The
resolution of large deﬁcits is, however, associated with a growth slowdown
that is deeper than average (table 4.4 and ﬁgure 4.3). Not surprisingly, they
also involve a signiﬁcantly greater adjustment in a three-year period. There
is no indication that deeper or more persistent deﬁcits are associated with
larger adjustments in interest rates or equity prices.
4.3.2 Consumption- versus Investment- versus 
Government-Driven Episodes
If current account deﬁcits are associated with consumption booms or
large ﬁscal deﬁcits, rather than a surge in the more productive investment
spending, the adjustment process might be more painful. Indeed, the cor-
relations in table 4.4 imply that deﬁcits driven by consumption growth in-
volve signiﬁcantly more depreciation in years 0 to 3. Similarly, deteriora-
tion in the ﬁscal balance increases depreciation, though the coeﬃcient is
not signiﬁcant at standard levels. Consumption driven deﬁcits are also as-
sociated with an increase in relative GDP growth 3year/3year. However,
further examination shows that this is due to lower growth during the pe-
riod when the deﬁcit is worsening, as opposed to higher growth in the re-
covery period; consistent with this, the correlation between consumption



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.growth in the preperiod and GDP growth relative to the long-run average
is insigniﬁcant. Deﬁcits driven by investment growth are associated with
signiﬁcantly slower income growth during recovery and signiﬁcantly less
depreciation than other episodes. These are likely the episodes that are
most cyclical. The relationship between investment and the exchange rate
adjustment is very strong (ﬁgure 4.4A). Interest rates and equity prices do
not appear to be inﬂuenced by whether the current account deﬁcit is asso-
ciated with surges in consumption, investment, or budget deﬁcits. Finally,
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A
B
Fig. 4.3 Real side eﬀects: A, Change in GDP growth vs. CA trough; B, Relative
GDP growth vs. adjustmentwe ﬁnd no evidence that the growth in the ﬁscal balance aﬀects GDP
growth relative to long-run average.
4.3.3 Openness
In well-integrated economies, only a small relative price change will be
needed to induce consumers to switch to domestic goods, thus reducing the
trade (and current account) deﬁcit. Thus, we expect that more open econ-
omies will experience less depreciation during adjustment. Looking at the
correlation between openness (measured as average openness during the
three years before reversal) and exchange rate adjustment, we ﬁnd very
little evidence that openness aﬀects exchange rate adjustment in industrial
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A
B
Fig. 4.4 Investment, exchange rate adjustment, and growth: A, Change in 
exchange rate (year 0 to 3) vs. investment growth (year –3 to 0); B, Total change 
in exchange rate vs. relative GDP growthcountries. The signs are correct, greater openness is associated with less
average and total depreciation and a lower likelihood of a crisis, but open-
ness is not signiﬁcant at standard levels.
4.3.4 Large Indebtedness to the Rest of the World
It can be argued that countries that rely heavily on foreign ﬁnancing are
more prone to quick reversals in foreign investment and that these quick re-
versals can induce considerable pain. For example, if foreigners hold a siz-
able portion of domestic assets (either in net or gross terms), their retreat
could spark a spike in interest rates, decreasing equity prices, low growth,
and a sharp depreciation.
To see whether this is true in our sample, we look at two measures of the
extent of indebtedness to the rest of the world. The ﬁrst is the size of the
NFA position relative to GDP. Here we see no evidence that countries with
large net debt positions (that is, negative NFA positions) have worse out-
comes with respect to their exchange rates, income growth, interest rates,
or equity prices. Counter to the evidence on exchange rate depreciation,
there does appear to be a higher incidence of currency crises in countries
with more negative NFA positions. The correlation with RESOLVE is neg-
ative, indicating that more negative NFA positions are (weakly) associated
with greater improvements in the current account balance; however, the
eﬀect of the current account trough on adjustment turns out to be the only
robustly signiﬁcant factor. The second measure we utilize is the size of the
country’s gross liabilities to the rest of the world (scaled by GDP). Here the
evidence is clear: larger gross liabilities positions do not appear to be asso-
ciated with signiﬁcantly worse outcomes.
While we do not ﬁnd evidence that a more negative NFA or gross liabil-
ities position results in worse outcomes, simple correlations can be mis-
leading if they are aﬀected by outliers. In ﬁgure 4.5we present scatter plots
of the relationships between gross liabilities positions and GDP growth
and currency movements. The ﬁgures show that, with or without outliers,
there is no apparent relationship between the extent of foreign indebted-
ness at the time of the current account trough and subsequent changes in
GDP or currency values.9 If anything, larger gross liabilities positions are
associated with less exchange rate depreciation.
4.3.5 Financing through Productive Means?
If the ﬁnancial system does not intermediate very well, one could be con-
cerned that large current account deﬁcits ﬁnanced by bond inﬂows are as-
sociated with borrowing binges that in the end bring more pain. In con-
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9. If foreign debt is largely foreign-currency denominated, as in many emerging markets
(Eichengreen and Hausmann 1999; Burger and Warnock 2004), the exchange rate deprecia-
tion associated with a current account reversal could lead to a painful balance-sheet eﬀect. In
our industrial country sample, this does not seem to be the case,trast, deﬁcits ﬁnanced by more productive inﬂows such as direct invest-
ment or equity inﬂows, because they went directly into productive uses,
may well adjust in a more benign fashion. However, if the ﬁnancial system
is adept at intermediating, the form of the inﬂow should not matter; the
system will ﬁnd the best use for the funds, whether they enter the country
as direct investment or short-term bond ﬂows.
The evidence we present suggests the latter case. We ﬁnd no evidence
that the type of ﬁnancing impacts the outcome for GDP growth or ex-




Fig. 4.5 Liabilities, exchange rate adjustment, and growth: A, Total change in 
exchange rate vs. NFA position; B, Total change in exchange rate vs. liabilities 
position; C, GDP growth vs. liabilities positionchange rates.10 Deﬁcits associated with larger bond inﬂows are associated
with larger subsequent increases in short-term interest rates and a greater
decrease in equity prices. This is consistent with the empirical evidence in
Warnock and Warnock (2005), who show that the cessation of large bond
inﬂows can lead to a substantial increase in interest rates (which, presum-
ably, could also lead to a sharper decrease in equity prices).
4.4 Multivariate Analysis
The simple correlations of table 4.4 indicated that larger deﬁcits are as-
sociated with a greater slowdown in growth, less exchange rate deprecia-
tion, and a greater adjustment in CA/GDP. They also imply that the use of
funds matter—deﬁcits funding investment spending tend to be associated
with slower growth during recovery and less depreciation. Of course, bilat-
eral correlations leave open the possibility that other factors are driving
these relationships. Parsing out eﬀects in a sample of twenty-six observa-
tions is diﬃcult, but in this section we attempt to determine whether these
relationships are robust or if other factors are more important. Speciﬁ-
cally, we regress GDP growth; percentage change in the exchange rate, that
is, appreciation or depreciation ( ER); and the extent to which the current
account deﬁcit is resolved in three years on the preconditions: the size of
the current account trough, whether it was preceded by a persistent deﬁcit,
the composition of spending variables, and (where relevant) openness and
the NFA position.
4.4.1 Growth Eﬀects
Table 4.5 investigates the factors that result in larger growth slowdowns.
The dependent variable is relative income growth relative to the long-run
average; consistent with table 4.4, the size of the current account at its
trough is highly signiﬁcant (column [1]).11 The coeﬃcient on the size of the
current account deﬁcit at its trough is 0.15, implying that a 1 percentage
point increase in the current account deﬁcit at its trough is associated with
a 0.15 percentage point slowdown in annual growth during the ﬁrst three
years of recovery. Including other factors—persistent deﬁcits; the magni-
tude of the NFA position, or investment; consumption, and ﬁscal growth
in the prerecovery period (columns [2] and [3])—does not materially im-
pact the size or signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient on CA/GDP, nor are these
other factors signiﬁcant. In column (4), we control for average growth in
the period before the deﬁcit reached its trough (lagged average growth);
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10. Perhaps paradoxically, we ﬁnd that greater productive inﬂows are associated with an in-
creased incidence of crisis.
11. We use GDP growth relative to long-run average because the GDP growth in the period
before adjustment—the denominator of GDP growth 3year/3year—is correlated with the
initial period variables, creating a bias.growth in the previous period is not signiﬁcant.12 Finally, in columns (5)
and (6), we test whether the relationship between growth slowdown and the
size of the deﬁcit owes to a few large deﬁcit countries. Excluding potential
outliers (see ﬁgure 4.3)—countries with deﬁcits that exceeded 10 percent
or, alternatively, those that exceeded 6 percent—does not materially re-
duce the magnitude of the coeﬃcient on CA/GDP, although when only the
three countries with extreme current account deﬁcits are excluded, the co-
eﬃcient is no longer signiﬁcant.
The results in table 4.5 indicate that the relationship between the size of
the current account deﬁcit and the subsequent growth slowdown is rather
robust. We caution, though, that while larger deﬁcits are correlated with
slower subsequent growth, this does not necessarily imply that larger
deﬁcits depress growth. It could be that the large deﬁcit may be the result
of a more ampliﬁed business cycle: strong growth exacerbates the deﬁcit
and the ensuing slowdown as the deﬁcit narrows is more severe. However,
as noted, even when we control for growth in the period when the deﬁcit ex-
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Table 4.5 Growth eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA/GDP at trough 0.15∗∗ 0.16∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.15∗∗ 0.14 0.48∗∗
(4.00) (2.81) (3.06) (3.90) (1.38) (4.79)
Preceded by persistent deﬁcit 0.81
(1.41)
CON/GDP growth (–3 to 0) 0.01
(0.09)
INV/GDP growth (–3 to 0) –0.05
(–0.64)
FISBAL/GDP growth (–3 to 0) –0.03
(–0.71)
NFA at trough –0.01
(–0.86)
Average GDP growth (–3 to 0) 0.01
(0.05)
Constant –0.30 –0.57 –0.37 –0.30 –0.33 0.87
(–1.13) (–1.28) (–1.28) (–1.13) (–0.81) (2.07)
R2 0.26 0.40 0.31 0.26 0.06 0.38
No. of observations 26 26 24 26 23 20
Notes: Dependent variable: GDP growth 0 to 3 relative to long-run average. Robust t-
statistics are in parentheses. Column (5) excludes countries with deﬁcits exceeding 10 percent
of GDP. Column (6) excludes countries with deﬁcits exceeding 6 percent of GDP.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
12. We measure income growth before the reversal analogously to income growth after the
reversal, as three-year average GDP growth before the adjustment relative to long-run GDP
growth.panded, the size of the deﬁcit is still highly signiﬁcant (table 4.5, column
[4]). It could be that greater growth before the deﬁcit reversed tends to gen-
erate larger deﬁcits, but the correlation between prereversal income growth
and CA/GDP at trough is close to zero and insigniﬁcant (not shown).
Thus, stronger growth as the deﬁcit worsened is not correlated with the
size of the deﬁcit, but weaker growth as the deﬁcit improved is correlated
with its size.13 Finally, if business-cycle eﬀects were the main driver of
the episode, the correlation between GDP growth (3year/3year) should be
highly correlated with the extent of adjustment, with deﬁcits that show a
larger resolution, experiencing a greater slowdown relative to the previous
three years, and therefore a more extreme business cycle. However, the cor-
relation between these variables is near zero and insigniﬁcant. In contrast,
GDP growth relative to long-term GDP growth is correlated with the ex-
tent of adjustment (ﬁgure 4.3). Thus, while the business cycle clearly plays
a role in these adjustments, it does not fully explain why larger deﬁcits are
associated with slower real income growth.
We note, too, that the correlations in table 4.4 suggest that the interest
rate channel is absent: bigger deﬁcits are not associated with bigger in-
creases in interest rates or with interest rates that are high relative to long-
run averages. Still, we ﬁnd that larger deﬁcits are associated with signiﬁ-
cantly lower investment during the current account recovery. Table 4.6
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13. We also ﬁnd that the size of the deﬁcit at its trough is uncorrelated with movements in
unemployment (not reported).
Table 4.6 Decomposing growth eﬀects
INV/GDP CON/GDP FIS/GDP NX/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
CA/GDP at trough 0.51∗∗ 0.67∗∗ 0.95∗∗ –0.03 –0.62∗∗ –0.44∗∗ 0.17 –0.45∗∗ –0.01
(3.77) (2.16) (3.87) (–0.15) (–2.42) (–2.16) (0.38) (–2.77) (–0.05)
CON/GDP growth  –0.49∗∗ –0.34∗∗
(–3 to 0) (–2.51) (–2.17)
INV/GDP growth  –0.22 –0.17 –0.08
(–3 to 0) (–1.63) (–1.25) (–0.71)
FISBAL/GDP –0.42 –0.36
growth (–3 to 0) (–1.53) (–1.11)
NX/GDP growth  –0.15 –0.13
(–3 to 0) (–1.16) (–0.71)
Constant –1.10 –0.47 0.48 0.50 –2.14 –3.21 –0.69 1.35 –3.23
(–1.70) (–0.40) (0.53) (0.40) (–1.76) (–2.49) (0.34) (1.76) (–3.40)
R2 0.61 0.42 0.47 0.25 0.37 0.27 0.19 0.44 0.05
No. of 
observations 26 23 20 26 23 25 22 26 23
Note: Robust t-statistics are in parentheses.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.records results when we decompose the growth eﬀects. Speciﬁcally, we
regress investment growth (year 0 to 3) on lagged investment growth (year
–3 to 0) and the current account trough to see if there is evidence of strong
investment growth that reverses (column [1]). Prereversal investment
growth is insigniﬁcant, while the current account trough remains highly
signiﬁcant, with a coeﬃcient of 0.5. The correlation is highly signiﬁcant
even when we exclude outliers (columns [2] and [3]). Thus, we cannot rule
out a depressing eﬀect of the current account deﬁcit on investment growth.
This is consistent with previous work showing that much of the adjustment
from a large current account deﬁcit comes through investment (Freund
2000, 2005), and, of course, larger deﬁcits require larger adjustments.
In contrast, the eﬀect of the current trough on other components of
GDP growth is not robustly signiﬁcant (columns [4]–[9]). Cyclical eﬀects
with respect to consumption are very strong—countries that had a con-
sumption boom as the current account deﬁcit worsened tend to have a de-
cline in consumption during the reversal. The size of the deﬁcit is corre-
lated with consumption when outliers are excluded, but the sign implies
that countries with larger deﬁcits had, if anything, less of a decline in con-
sumption. This implies that the welfare eﬀects of large deﬁcits may be lim-
ited, depending on the extent to which GDP declines during adjustment.
4.4.2 Exchange Rate Eﬀects
Tables 4.7 and 4.8report results when average exchange rate adjustment
(from year 0 to year 3) and total exchange rate adjustment are the depend-
ent variables, respectively. For average exchange rate adjustment, a num-
ber of the variables displayed a signiﬁcant correlation (table 4.4). When all
of these variables are included in the regression, we ﬁnd that there are ro-
bust eﬀects from being preceded by a persistent episode and from the ex-
tent of investment growth before reversal (table 4.8). In particular, both the
presence of a persistent deﬁcit and the extent of investment growth before
the reversal reduce the extent of depreciation that is required to accom-
modate adjustment. We also control for the exchange rate adjustment as
the deﬁcit worsened (column [3]) and removing potential outliers (columns
[4] and [5]). The result is very strong and suggests that a 1 percentage point
increase in investment as a share of GDP as the deﬁcit is expanding leads
nearly 1 percentage point less average annual depreciation during the cur-
rent account recovery. In addition, the presence of a persistent deﬁcit re-
duces average depreciation by about 3 percentage points annually. As
shown in ﬁgure 4.4, the correlation between investment growth in the pre-
period and average exchange rate movement is very strong.
Investment growth in the period when the current account is worsening
also reduces the extent of total depreciation (table 4.8). In particular, a 1
percentage point increase in investment is associated with a total depreci-
ation that is about 2.5 percentage points smaller. The result is robust to
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exchange rate reversed (column [2]), to including other variables (columns
[3] and [4]), and to removing outliers (columns [5] and [6]). If we regress to-
tal exchange rate adjustment on a constant alone, the coeﬃcient is –16.3
(not reported), implying that, on average, a total real depreciation of about
16 percent is required for adjustment.
In both speciﬁcations, we can reject that the coeﬃcients on consumption
growth and ﬁscal deterioration are equal to the coeﬃcient on investment
growth. We cannot reject that consumption and ﬁscal deterioration have
the same eﬀect on exchange rate movements. This implies that deﬁcits
driven by consumption or ﬁscal deterioration are associated with signiﬁ-
cantly more depreciation than those driven by investment.
When total exchange rate adjustment is the dependent variable, the
presence of a persistent deﬁcit is not statistically signiﬁcant (column [4])
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Table 4.7 Exchange rate eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA/GDP at trough 0.05 –0.09 0.05 0.06 0.46 0.37
(0.59) (–0.79) (0.57) (0.64) (1.99) (0.93)
Preceded by persistent  3.28∗∗ 3.75∗∗ 3.23∗∗ 3.22∗∗ 3.35∗∗ 3.10∗∗
deﬁcit (3.76) (3.48) (3.65) (3.40) (3.02) (2.35)
CON/GDP growth (–3 to 0) 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.19 0.19
(0.83) (0.95) (0.84) (0.74) (0.78) (0.71)
INV/GDP growth (–3 to 0) 0.85∗∗ 0.71∗∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.92∗∗ 0.92∗∗
(5.99) (3.44) (5.68) (5.74) (6.46) (5.86)
FISBAL/GDP growth (–3 to 0) –0.17 –0.06 –0.17 –0.17 –0.14 –0.13
(–1.97) (–0.36) (–1.82) (–1.89) (–1.33) (–1.27)
NFA at trough 0.03
(1.54)
Average exchange adjustment  –0.04
(–3 to 0) (–0.34)
Openness 0.00
(0.27)
Constant –3.54 –3.63 –3.53 –3.66 –1.91 –2.17
(–4.10) (–4.09) (–3.92) (–3.42) (–1.53) (–1.18)
F-test predcon   predinv 16.38 5.22 15.06 13.45 10.38 9.84
[0.00] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.01] [0.01]
F-test – predﬁs   predinv 21.38 25.34 19.75 20.75 26.21 20.39
[0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
F-test – predﬁs   predcon 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03
[0.96] [0.68] [0.97] [0.94] [0.85] [0.86]
R2 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.74
No. of observations 26 24 26 26 23 20
Notes:Dependent variable: average annual real exchange rate adjustment, year 0 to 3. Robust t-statistics
are in parentheses. P-values are in brackets.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.though the sign still implies that persistent deﬁcit countries experience less
depreciation. The somewhat contradictory results on persistent deﬁcits
with respect to average and total exchange rate adjustment imply that be-
ing preceded by a persistent deﬁcit does not aﬀect total depreciation but
does aﬀect depreciation in the recovery period. In the persistent episodes,
depreciation begins somewhat earlier, with stronger j-curve eﬀects.
We do not ﬁnd strong evidence that openness aﬀects the extent of de-
preciation that accompanies reversals.14 When average exchange rate ad-
justment is the dependent variable, the coeﬃcient is close to zero and in-
signiﬁcant. When total exchange rate adjustment is the dependent
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Table 4.8 Total exchange rate adjustment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CA/GDP at trough 0.34
(0.78)
Preceded by persistent deﬁcit 5.84
(1.14)
CON/GDP growth (–3 to 0) 0.36
(0.41)
INV/GDP growth (–3 to 0) 2.58∗∗ 2.40∗∗ 2.33∗∗ 2.83∗∗ 2.75∗∗ 2.86∗∗
(5.69) (4.79) (4.31) (3.71) (5.26) (5.52)
FISBAL/GDP growth (–3 to 0) –0.24
(–0.49)




Total exchange adjustment  –0.20 –0.18 –0.08
before currency reversal (–1.19) (–0.92) (–0.38)
Constant –17.60 –14.74 –14.91 –22.31 –18.11 –16.96
(–10.77) (–4.48) (–3.49) (–2.54) (–11.37) (–10.27)
F-test predcon   predinv 6.62
[0.02]
F-test – predﬁs   predinv 12.84
[0.00]
F-test – predﬁs   predcon 0.01
[0.92]
R2 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.63 0.59 0.64
No. of observations 26 26 24 26 23 20
Notes: Dependent variable: total real exchange rate adjustment. Robust t-statistics are in parentheses.
P-values are in brackets. Columns (5) and (6) exclude countries with current account (CA) GDP rations
less than –10 and –6, respectively.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
14. We also try controlling for the size of the economy by regressing openness on ln(GDP)
and using the residual, but the results are similar.variable, the coeﬃcient has the expected sign: greater openness reduces de-
preciation, but it is not signiﬁcant. It could be that the trade-GDP ratio is
a bad measure of the extent of openness at the margin. Alternatively, the
small sample size could be an issue.15 In addition, countries now in the Eu-
ropean Union make more than half of the sample and may have similar lev-
els of integration. Finally, overall openness may not be what is relevant, but
rather the price elasticity of imports and exports and their various compo-
nents (Mann and Plück, chap. 7 in this volume).
4.4.3 Adjustment
Table 4.9reports results on adjustment eﬀects. Only the size of the deﬁcit
matters for the extent to which it is resolved after three years. We ﬁnd that
for each 1 percentage point increase in the current account trough, three
years into recovery, the current account is about .5 percentage points
larger. The coeﬃcient on CA/GDP at trough is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
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15. If we exclude Belgium, with an openness measure exceeding 120 percent, the coeﬃcient
on openness is highly signiﬁcant, provided only investment growth (year –3 to 0) and open-
ness are included in the regression.
Table 4.9 Adjustment eﬀects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CA/GDP at trough –0.51∗∗ –0.55∗∗ –0.59∗∗ –0.36 –0.53
(–3.42) (–2.81) (–3.76) (–1.95) (–1.63)
Preceded by persistent deﬁcit –1.32
(–1.21)
CON/GDP growth (–3 to 0) 0.05
(0.26)
INV/GDP growth (–3 to 0) –0.18
(–1.25)




NFA at trough 0.01
(0.56)
Constant 1.66 1.77 1.11 2.33 1.76
(2.24) (2.49) (1.22) (2.89) (1.44)
F-test CAtrough   –1 10.67 5.30 6.61 11.94 2.20
[0.00] [0.03] [0.02] [0.00] [0.16]
R2 0.56 0.55 0.65 0.15 0.17
No. of observations 26 24 26 23 20
Notes: Dependent variable: resolve, percentage point resolution of CA/GDP after 3 years.
Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. P-values are in brackets.
∗∗Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.negative one (except when we exclude deﬁcits exceeding 6 percent of
GDP), indicating that larger deﬁcits remain signiﬁcantly larger after 3
years. Thus, large deﬁcits are not as completely resolved as small ones af-
ter three years.
4.4.4 Summary of Results
The results show that larger deﬁcits are associated with slower income
growth during the current account recovery period and take somewhat
longer to resolve. Growth eﬀects are more severe because more adjustment
is required when the current account deﬁcit is greater. Indeed, as we have
shown, growth (relative to long run) is negatively correlated with the extent
of adjustment (ﬁgure 4.3). Although deeper deﬁcits are associated with
slower growth, they do not appear to require more depreciation. Once we
control for other variables, exchange rate movements are not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent in countries with deeper deﬁcits. In part, this may be because
nominal exchange rate adjustment is limited in some industrial countries,
either because of managed systems, ﬁxed exchange rates, or because key
trading partners ﬁx exchange rates. Restricted exchange rate adjustment in
turn leads to more extreme current account deﬁcits and lower income
growth during current account recovery. Income growth is forced to ac-
commodate adjustment precisely because depreciation is not more severe.
Indeed, there is a strong inverse correlation between the extent of exchange
rate adjustment and the slowdown in GDP growth (ﬁgure 4.4B). There is a
tradeoﬀ: adjustment comes through either exchange movements or GDP
growth. If exchange rates movements are limited, the current account po-
sition worsens further, and the GDP hit is more extreme.
We also found that the resolution of persistent deﬁcits and of deﬁcits
with large negative NFA positions is broadly similar to others, in terms of
total exchange rate adjustment and growth eﬀects. Investment-driven cur-
rent accounts require less exchange rate adjustment than episodes driven
by consumption or government spending. This implies that investment
channels resources into exports that can eventually service the debt. Fi-
nally, we found that ﬁnancing does not matter signiﬁcantly for the adjust-
ment process, suggesting that markets are eﬃcient at intermediating funds.
4.5 Implications for the United States
In 1987, the U.S. deﬁcit was driven largely by consumption—from 1984
to 1987 consumption grew 2.5 percentage points, while investment de-
clined by 2 percentage points. Table 4.10 reports predictions, based on the
signiﬁcant variables in the preceding regressions, and actual eﬀects. It also
reports predictions that are based on the assumption that the U.S. current
account deﬁcit begins its reversal this year; that is, predictions that use
2004 values of the initial conditions for the United States. For the 1987
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ment—total depreciation was somewhat higher than predicted, and aver-
age depreciation during the recovery was right on target. The model pre-
dicted slower growth and a larger adjustment than actually occurred.16
Despite the large current account deﬁcit, the model predicts roughly the
same total depreciation now and less depreciation from year 0 to year 3.
The reason is that investment growth has been somewhat stronger and it is
a persistent deﬁcit, and persistent deﬁcits tend to involve less depreciation
during recovery.
Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 also show the predicted values for the United
States—again, under the assumption that the reversal begins this year—
with an open circle labeled US04. From those simple bilateral relation-
ships, which do not take into account other factors, we see that were the
U.S. current account deﬁcit to begin a reversal this year, we would expect
the following: a slowdown in GDP growth (panel A of ﬁgure 4.3 or panel
C of ﬁgure 4.5) and a real exchange rate depreciation of about 4 percent go-
ing forward (panel A of ﬁgure 4.4) and 17 percent from its peak (panel A
of ﬁgure 4.5 or panel B of ﬁgure 4.5). Of course, most of these bilateral re-
lationships are not at all tight, so wide (sometimes very wide) conﬁdence
intervals—most of which would encompass zero—must be placed around
these point estimates.
Finally, a striking feature of ﬁgures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 is that the United
States is in no way an exception when placed with other current account re-
versal episodes. That is, the United States is typically found in the middle
of the scatter plot and is never an outlier. There is, however, one aspect in
which the United States is an outlier. Figure 4.6 shows that U.S. gross lia-
bilities scaled by rest-of-the-world GDP—essentially, what portion of rest-
of-the-world wealth ends up in the United States—are far larger than any
other country’s gross liabilities. There are two things to note about this ﬁg-
158 Caroline Freund and Frank Warnock
Table 4.10 U.S. adjustment
Total exchange  Average exchange rate  Relative  3 year 
rate adjustment adjustmenta (year 0 to 3) growthb adjustmentc
1987 predicted –22.91 –4.28 –0.81 3.40
1987 actual –34.41 –4.25 0.23 2.05
2005 predicted –23.66 –2.25 –1.05 4.20
aIncluded variable is investment growth, year –3 to 0.
bIncluded variables are preceded by persistent deﬁcit and investment growth, year –3 to 0.
cIncluded variable is current account trough.
16. Using time series data over the same period and analyzing thresholds of adjustment,
Clarida, Goretti, and Taylor (chap. 5 in this volume) also ﬁnd that U.S. adjustment is slow rel-
ative to other countries.ure. First, the ﬁtted line is meaningless because the conﬁdence band on the
point estimate would be enormous, and the ﬁtted line would not be down-
ward sloping if we excluded the United States. Second, while the United
States might look like an outlier on this graph, and perhaps to an econo-
mist, portfolio theory would suggest that the United States should have an
even greater gross liabilities position. Because the United States is roughly
half of global capital markets, simple portfolio theory would predict that
U.S. liabilities should be roughly 50 percent of rest-of-the-world wealth,
not the 37 percent we see today.
While looking at previous episodes oﬀers some useful insights into how
a U.S. adjustment might occur, there are several reasons to believe the
United States is a special case. The main one is the size of the United States
and, thus, the large capital inﬂows necessary to ﬁnance the deﬁcit. In ad-
dition, currency management by trade partners, who would suﬀer from a
sharp U.S. adjustment, has limited exchange rate movements. The status of
the dollar as the reserve currency also has important implications for ad-
justment. Finally, the fact that debt is denominated in U.S. dollars makes
depreciation less costly to domestic residents.
4.6 Conclusion
We have shown that large deﬁcits are associated with a signiﬁcant slow-
down in income growth though, if anything, they involve less depreciation.
We think these facts are related. In countries where exchange movements
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Fig. 4.6 Total change in exchange rate vs. liabilities position scaled by ROW GDPare limited, either because of managed systems, ﬁxed exchange rates, or key
partners ﬁx exchange rates, the current account will deteriorate more than
if the exchange rate were ﬂexible. Moreover, because of restricted exchange
adjustment, growth will be forced to do much of the work of adjustment.
Indeed, there is a very robust inverse correlation between income growth
and the total exchange rate adjustment during the recovery.
In contrast, persistent deﬁcits do not lead to a more severe adjustment.
Our results suggest that they may be slightly less disruptive in terms of ex-
change rate movement, with depreciation beginning earlier in the episode
and being somewhat more limited. In general, persistent-deﬁcit countries
are characterized by a low savings rate.
We also ﬁnd that deﬁcits driven by investment growth are more benign
in terms of exchange rate adjustment than deﬁcits driven by consumption
or ﬁscal spending. This is intuitive as these are the economies where the ac-
crued debt can be more easily serviced. There is only weak evidence that
the level of openness reduces the magnitude of exchange adjustment.
On the ﬁnancing side, we ﬁnd that the nature of the inﬂows while the cur-
rent account deﬁcit is worsening does not impact the outcome. That is,
whether the ﬁnancing of the deﬁcit comes through inﬂows of equity, direct
investment, bonds, or bank deposits has no apparent bearing on the ad-
justment process, possibly because ﬁnancial systems in industrial coun-
tries intermediate these ﬂows rather well. Finally, the size of the foreign li-
abilities position seems to be uncorrelated with the adjustment process.
Appendix
Data
Average Exchange Rate Adjustment (–):Average exchange rate adjustment
from year 0 to 3, including year 0 exchange rate adjustment. Deprecia-
tion is negative.
CA/GDP at Trough: Minimum current account deﬁcit before reversal.
CRISIS:An indicator variable that is one if there was an exchange crisis in
that year, as deﬁned by Frankel and Rose (1996).
GDP Growth 3yr/3yr: Three-year average GDP growth after reversal (year
0 to 3) relative to three-year average GDP growth before reversal.
GDP Growth 3yr/LT:Three-year average GDP growth (year 0 to 3) relative
to average GDP growth from 1980 to 2003.
Total Exchange Rate Adjustment (–):Total exchange rate adjustment from
exchange rate peak to trough between year –3 and 3. A currency depre-
ciation is negative.
160 Caroline Freund and Frank WarnockCON/GDP Growth: Percentage point growth in consumption in the three
years before the reversal.
FIS BAL/GDP Growth:Percentage point growth in the ﬁscal balance in the
three years before the reversal.
INV/GDP Growth: Percentage point growth in investment in the three
years before the reversal.
OPENNESS: Average (imports   exports)/GDP in the three years before
the reversal.
Preceded by Persistent: An indicator variable that is one if the reversal was
preceded by a persistent deﬁcit.
RESOLVE: The percentage point improvement in the current account in
three years (year 0 to year 3).
NFA/GDP:Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) data, equals gross assets minus
gross liabilities (scaled by GDP). Deﬁned at the trough of the CA bal-
ance.
Gross Liabilities/GDP:Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005) data, deﬁned at the
trough of the CA balance.
Share of Bond Inﬂows: Bond inﬂows divided by overall ﬁnancial account
inﬂows, averaged over years –3 to 0.
Share of DI/Equity Inﬂows: Direct investment and equity inﬂows divided
by overall ﬁnancial account inﬂows, averaged over years –3 to 0.
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Comment Assaf Razin
There are two major channels through which the current account deﬁcits
turn into surpluses: the intertemporal budget adjustment channel and the
ﬁnancial adjustment channel. According to the ﬁrst channel, unsustain-
able current account deﬁcits need to be reversed eventually in order to sat-
isfy the country’s intertemporal budget constraint. The second channel
works as follows. Part of the current account adjustment can take place
through a change in the returns on domestic assets held by foreigners, rel-
ative to foreign assets held by domestic residents. In the presence of sto-
chastic asset returns and interest rates, unexpected capital gains and losses
on gross external asset positions could signiﬁcantly alter the need to run
future trade surpluses or deﬁcits.
In the 1990s, a number of papers have assessed current account sustain-
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Assaf Razin is the Bernard Schwartz Professor of Global Markets at Tel Aviv University,
the Friedman Professor of International Economics at Cornell University, and a research as-
sociate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.ability, taking into account a number of other macroeconomic and ﬁnan-
cial indicators such as the level of saving and investment, the level of the
real exchange rate, the burden of external liabilities, the size of short-term
debt relative to reserves, and, more generally, ﬁnancial-sector exposure
and vulnerability. (See, e.g., Milesi-Ferretti and Razin 1996, 1998, 2000.)
These studies are also related to the more formal literature on early warn-
ing indicators that attempt to predict currency crises.
In a similar vein, the present work by Freund and Warnock addresses
key side eﬀects of current account reversals in industrialized economies.
They ﬁnd that larger preexisting deﬁcits take longer to adjust and are as-
sociated with signiﬁcantly slower income growth (relative to trend) than
smaller deﬁcits during the current account improvement phase. They also
ﬁnd that consumption-driven current account deﬁcits involve signiﬁcantly
larger depreciations than deﬁcits that serve to ﬁnance investment spend-
ing. They also bring out interesting evidence that economies that run per-
sistent deﬁcits (and, therefore, have large net foreign debt positions) are ac-
commodated by a more pronounced exchange rate adjustment, or slower
growth, during the transition to a balanced current account position.
Methodology and Findings
Freund and Warnock characterize deﬁcits by the extent to which they
were resolved after three years. Speciﬁcally, the variable RESOLVE is de-
ﬁned as the percentage point improvement in the current account GDP ra-
tio from year 0 to year 3. This variable allows them to test whether other
factors are correlated with the current account adjustment and also the ex-
tent to which the average deﬁcit is improved. That is, a coeﬃcient on CA/
GDP at trough of –1 would imply that deﬁcits are fully reversed after three
years, whereas a coeﬃcient of –.5 would imply they are 50 percent reversed.
Their ﬁndings are as follows.
Growth Equation
The regression equation is
Growth   a(CAtrough)   b(Preper)   c(Predcon) 
  d(Predinv)   e(Predﬁs)   ERROR.
They ﬁnd that only the coeﬃcient a is signiﬁcant.
Depreciation Equation
The regression equation is
Depreciation   a(CAtrough)   b(Preper)   c(Predcon) 
  d(Predinv)   e(Predﬁs)   ERROR.
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Resolution Equation
The regression equation is
Resolve   a(CAtrough)   b(Preper)   c(Predcon) 
  d(Predinv)   e(Predﬁs)   ERROR.
They ﬁnd that only the coeﬃcient a is signiﬁcant.
Consumption and Investment Growth Rates
The correlations in table 4.4 imply that deﬁcits driven by consumption
growth involve signiﬁcantly more depreciation in years 0 to 3. Similarly,
deterioration in the ﬁscal balance increases depreciation, though the co-
eﬃcient is not signiﬁcant at standard levels. Consumption driven deﬁ-
cits are also associated with an increase in relative GDP growth. Deﬁcits
driven by investment growth are associated with signiﬁcantly slower
income growth during recovery and signiﬁcantly less depreciation than
other episodes.
Large Indebtedness to the Rest of the World
Freund and Warnock ﬁnd no evidence that countries with large net debt
positions (that is, negative net foreign asset positions) have worse out-
comes with respect to their exchange rates, income growth, interest rates,
or equity prices. Contrary to the evidence on exchange rate depreciation,
there does appear to be a higher incidence of currency crises in countries
with more negative net foreign asset positions. The correlation with
RESOLVE is negative, indicating that more negative NFA positions are
(weakly) associated with greater improvements in the current account bal-
ance. The second measure they utilize is the size of the country’s gross lia-
bilities to the rest of the world (scaled by GDP). Here the evidence is
clearer: larger gross liabilities positions do not appear to be associated with
signiﬁcantly worse outcomes.
A caveat in the analysis is that it does not address the issue of hetero-
geneity across countries, especially as regards policy credibility. What is at
stake here is the possibility that self-selectivity be the main determinant in
the regression: when the probability of current account deﬁcit is high (the
current account trough variable), the country’s macroeconomic policy
credibility is low. At the same time policy credibility aﬀect the future reso-
lution of the current account imbalance (the RESOLVE variable). Con-
trolling for country ﬁxed eﬀects or including instrumented macropolicy
variables are ways to address this self-selection issue.
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Freund and Warnock have essentially only a ﬁrst-pass look at the anal-
ysis of current account reversals. They are not able to identify speciﬁc
mechanisms that are underlying the current account adjustment process.
Here is a list of key mechanisms behind current account adjustments.
Return Diﬀerentials across Assets and Liabilities
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004, 2005) and Gourinchas and Rey (chap. 1
in this volume) document that a given rate-of-return diﬀerential between
assets and liabilities exerts a larger eﬀect on the dynamics of the net posi-
tion when the volume of gross external portfolios grows. This has been in-
deed the trend particularly during the past decade. The relative importance
of direct investment and portfolio equity investment in international port-
folios has increased, and those ﬁnancial instruments have on average
higher and more volatile returns than debt instruments.
Resource Transfer through Depreciation
Almost all of U.S. foreign liabilities are in dollars, where 70 percent of
U.S. foreign assets are in foreign currencies. Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti
and Phillip Lane (2004, 2005) calculate that between 2002 and 2004, more
than 75 percent of the increase in America’s net foreign indebtedness
caused by the current account deﬁcit was oﬀset by changes in the value of
external assets and liabilities as a result of the dollar’s fall. Thus a big ex-
ternal deﬁcit does not necessarily imply a commensurate rise in net in-
debtedness to foreigners.
Exchange Rate Regimes and Sudden Stops
The heterogeneity of exchange rate regimes in the sample used by Fre-
und and Warnock has not been adequately exploited in their analysis. Fi-
nancial crises theory suggests that the way expectations by market par-
ticipants are coordinated may trigger a ﬁnancial crisis in a situation
characterized by a latent threshold state of the economy. A ﬁnancial crisis
occurs if the latent variable is below a certain threshold. Above the thresh-
old, ﬁnancial crises are avoided, and the economic performance is strong.
The estimated probability of sudden stops proxies the latent threshold state
variable. (See Razin and Rubinstein 2005.) There are good reasons to ex-
pect that the crisis threshold is also directly aﬀected by the policy regime
itself. For example, a peg is expected to lower the crisis threshold, and thus
increase the crisis probability, for any given combination of country-
speciﬁc and world economy shocks. Likewise, capital market liberalization
tends to raise the crisis probability. In other words, the adoption of a peg
is expected to have a direct positive eﬀect on growth, through the trade
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probability channel. Similarly, the adoption of capital account liberaliza-
tion is expected to have a direct positive eﬀect on growth, through capital
market eﬃciency channels, and an indirect negative eﬀect, through a crisis-
probability channel.
Debt Dollarization
Razin and Rubinstein (2006) bring out evidence for the role of balance
sheets in sudden-stop episodes. They use the ratio of the country’s foreign
currency liabilities to its money supply (FLM) as a proxy for the country’s
foreign currency exposure to ﬂuctuations in the real exchange rate. Table
4C.1 provides estimates of the inﬂuence of a policy-regime switch on debt
polarization. Column (1) indicates that the policy regimes (a switch to peg,
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Table 4C.2 The eﬀect of sudden stop crisis on dollarization (foreign liabilities –
money supply ratio)
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Crisis at t – 2 –0.034 –0.034
(0.020) (0.020)
Peg at time t – 2 0.042 0.010
(0.024) (0.028)
Capital controls at t – 2 –0.013 –0.009
(0.028) (0.028)
The probability of having currency crisis this year^ –0.200 –0.176
(0.070) (0.083)
Country ﬁxed eﬀect Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1,176 1,176 1,176
Table 4C.1 The eﬀect of sudden stop crisis and dollarization (foreign liabilities –
money supply ratio) on growth
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Foreign Liabilities – Money Supply Ratio (FLM) 0.001 –0.001 0.000
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Sudden Stop Crisis –0.881 –0.781 –0.250
(0.384) (0.378) (0.431)
Growth at t – 1 0.173 0.172
(0.021) (0.021)
Interaction
Sudden Stop Crisis   FLM –2.384
(0.931)
Country ﬁxed eﬀect Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 2,228 2,228 2,228and the imposition of capital controls) do not have a direct eﬀect on po-
larization. Column (2) indicates a signiﬁcant eﬀect of the crisis probability,
as a single explanatory variable, on polarization. Column (3) indicates that
policy regimes do not directly aﬀect polarization, but only indirectly aﬀect
polarization through the probability of sudden stops. Table 4C.2 demon-
strates how debt polarization inﬂuences growth. Columns (1) and (2) of
table 4C.2 indicate that the polarization measure (FLM) does not have di-
rect inﬂuence on growth, once one controls for the actual realization of
sudden stop crises. A crisis, as expected, reduces growth in a signiﬁcant
way. In column (3) of table 4C.2, the interaction between polarization and
the realized sudden stops is added. The coeﬃcient of the interaction term
is negative and highly signiﬁcant. This means that although polarization
does not have an independent inﬂuence on growth, the interaction between
polarization and sudden stops tends to reduce the growth rate drastically.
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